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In its decisions over the last several years, the United States
Supreme Court has demonstrated an increasingly pronounced
preference for protecting large-scale corporate financial interests.
Employing such tools as a formalistic interpretation of contract
law, and strict, narrow construction of contract language, the
Court has sought to create a business arena in which financial
expectations are certain and actors’ preferences remain static.
By redefining and reshaping existing contract law, the Court is
actively altering both the environment in which transactions are
perpetuated and the rights of those who are attempting to for-
malize their agreements.
The Court continues this trend in Mobil Oil Exploration &
Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States .1  A decision ex-
panding the availability of restitution, limiting the opportunity to
raise a waiver defense, and redefining what constitutes action on
the contract when the government is a contracting party.  This
Note examines Mobil , and the important implications arising
from it.  Part I recounts the essential facts of the case, describes
* J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2002.  Managing Editor, Oregon Law
Review,  2001-2002.  The author wishes to thank Professor Ralph James Mooney for
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1 530 U.S. 604 (2000).
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the relevant contract law principles, and sets forth the Court’s
holding and rationale.  Part II discusses the implications that
arise from the alteration of established contract principles and
from the expansion of actions affecting a contract.  The Note
concludes by addressing the long-term impact that a shift in doc-
trine will entail and by pointing to the potential transformation
of law suggested by the decision.
I
THE MECHANICS OF MOBIL OIL EXPLORATION &
PRODUCING SOUTHEAST, INC. V.
UNITED STATES
A. The Facts
In 1981, two oil companies, Mobil Oil Southeast (Mobil) and
Marathon Oil Company (Marathon) contracted with the United
States government for renewable ten-year mineral exploration
leases off the North Carolina coast.2  In exchange for the leases,
the companies paid $158 million in cash bonus payments, in addi-
tion to annual rental payments of approximately $250,000 per
year.3  The companies were allowed to develop any oil they
found, with the government receiving development royalties.
The leases were subject to existing statutes and regulations plac-
ing certain limitations on exploration and development.
Two laws in particular, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA)4 and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
(CZMA),5 placed considerable restrictions on obtaining permis-
sion to explore and develop the area in question.  Of particular
relevance to the case was the requirement that the Department
of the Interior must approve the companies’ exploration plan
within thirty days of submission.6  Additionally, the state affected
by the oil exploration had the right to object to the exploration
plan, enacting additional statutory mechanisms for approval.7
2 Id.  at 607.
3 Id.  at 609.  The Court’s description of the facts includes a discrepancy as to the
actual amount of the up-front payment.  The amount first appears as $156 million.
Each subsequent reference is $158 million.
4 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
5 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
6 Mobil , 530 U.S. at 610.
7 Id.  The statutes place four primary restrictions on the contracted activity.  First,
the companies must submit, and the Department of Interior must approve, an explo-
ration plan.  The Interior can deny the plan if it finds that the plan would cause
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In 1989, seven years after initially entering into the lease con-
tracts, Mobil and Marathon created a memorandum of under-
standing in which they agreed to submit an initial draft of their
exploration plan to the state and the Department of the Interior
(the Interior).8  The Interior promised that it would prepare an
environmental report based on this draft and would suspend the
annual lease payments until any state objections were overcome
and the exploration plan finalized.9  Ten months after receiving
the initial draft, the Interior concluded that the companies’ ex-
ploration plan would not have a significant environmental effect
on marine or human life.10  Thus, on August 20, 1990, both com-
panies submitted their final exploration plan to the Interior.11
Two days earlier, on August 18, 1990, Congress enacted the
Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA) which prohibited the Inte-
rior from approving any exploration plan until four additional
requirements were met.12  Among these terms included a re-
quirement that a newly formed review panel approve the plan
and a prohibition against the approval of any new plans until Oc-
tober of 1991.13
Five weeks after the companies submitted their exploration
plans, the Interior informed the state and the companies via let-
ter that the exploration plan was “approvable in all respects.”14
The Interior’s approval stated that the plan fully complied with
the law and had only negligible effects on the environment.15
serious harm to life, property, the marine environment, or national security.  The
Interior must act on the plan within thirty days.  Secondly, the companies must cer-
tify that their exploration plan is consistent with the coastal zone management pro-
gram of each affected state, in order to obtain an exploratory well drilling permit.
Three superceding bodies have authority to deny the permit under these conditions:
the affected state, the Secretary of Commerce, and finally, the Interior.  Thirdly, the
companies must obtain a special permit if waste will be discharged into the ocean.
Finally, upon successful exploration, the companies must obtain a development plan
which is subject to the same approval hierarchy described above. Id . at 609-10.




12 Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 6003, 104 Stat. 484, 555-58 (1990) (repealed 1996).
13 Id.  The statute imposed four new requirements on exploratory activity.  The
statute created a review panel reporting to the Secretary of the Interior, the Secre-
tary had to certify to Congress that he was adequately informed to make a decision
regarding approval, Congress had to be in session for forty-five days before any plan
could be approved, and no plan could be awarded until October 1991. Id .
14 Mobil , 530 U.S. at 612.
15 Id.
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However, the Interior’s letter cited the OBPA as prohibiting the
Interior from officially granting approval of any exploration plan
at that time.16  Thus, it informed the companies that it would sus-
pend the leases and retain the plan on file until the OBPA re-
quirements were met.17
In November of 1990, the state objected to the companies’
plan, citing insufficient information regarding the potential envi-
ronmental impact of the exploration.18  One month later, the
companies requested that the Secretary of Commerce override
the state’s objection.19  Eighteen months after the Interior sus-
pended the leases, the Secretary of the Interior certified that he
had adequate information to rule on the plans, but could not pro-
ceed further until the new panel submitted its recommendation.20
In October of 1992, the companies brought a breach of con-
tract suit against the federal government, alleging the govern-
ment repudiated its lease contracts by delaying its permission for
the companies to begin oil exploration.21  The Court of Federal
Claims found for the oil companies, ruling that the government
breached its general contractual obligation to follow the provi-
sions of OCSLA and its specific obligation to approve an explo-
ration plan within thirty days of its submission.22  The court
found that this action amounted to repudiation, entitling the
companies to restitution.  In addition, the court ordered a refund
of the upfront cash payment the companies made to the govern-
ment.23  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that the state’s objection to the companies’ plan would
have prevented exploration; the government’s ultimate refusal
and delay in considering the final plan, therefore, was not the
cause of any failure to carry out the terms of the contract.24  The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the
16 Id.
17 Id.  at 612-13.
18 Id.  at 613.
19 Id.
20 Id.  The review panel did not rule until 1994, finding inadequate information
regarding specific environmental concerns.  At that time, the Secretary of Com-




23 Id.  at 613-14.
24 Id.  at 614.
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Federal Circuit.25
B. Background Law
Contract law that governs contractual relationships between
private individuals also defines the United States’ rights and du-
ties when it enters into a contractual obligation.26  Thus, all perti-
nent common law doctrines and Restatements apply when
analyzing the federal government’s obligations as a contracting
party.
Repudiation consists of an unequivocal indication by the repu-
diating party that it intends not to perform its contractual obliga-
tions.27  It is a “statement of intention by the repudiator . . . as to
what he will and will not do without regard to any acceptance or
expression of will by the other party.”28  Repudiation is not an
offer to make or rescind a contract.29  Mere inaction does not
constitute repudiation.30  Further, repudiation does not occur if
the promisor validly terminates the contract upon the occurrence
of certain circumstances.31  Unlike waiver, in which a party vol-
untarily relinquishes a known right, repudiation entails volunta-
rily committing an anticipatory breach.32
Repudiation of a contract may occur in two ways.  First, a
promisor can state to the promisee that it will commit a type of
breach that would allow the promisee to bring a claim for total
breach.33  Alternatively, repudiation can occur through a “volun-
tary affirmative act” which renders the promisor either actually
or apparently unable to perform without committing this type of
breach.34  For a statement to constitute repudiation, it must be
“sufficiently positive to be reasonably interpreted to mean that
the party will not or cannot perform.”35  An expression of doubt
is not sufficient to constitute repudiation.36  The promisor’s
25 Id.
26 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996).
27 13 RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS BY SAMUEL
WILLISTON § 39:40 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter WILLISTON].
28 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1105 (1964).
29 Id.
30 WILLISTON, supra  note 27, § 39:40.
31 Id.
32 Id.  § 39:38.
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1981).
34 Id.
35 Id.  at cmt. b.
36 Id.
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repudiatory statement must be directed to a promisee of the con-
tract.37  If an injured party urges the repudiating party to con-
tinue to perform or to retract his repudiation, the legal effect of
the repudiation does not change.38
Repudiation creates rights in the injured party to cease its own
performance and to be compensated for the injury.39  Repudia-
tion may have three consequences: it excuses the non-occurrence
of a condition, discharges duties under a contract, and allows for
recovery of damages for total breach.40  Repudiation only gives
rise to damages for total breach if there is a breach with regard to
the entirety of performance.  A breach of partial performance
would not give rise to such a remedy.41
Total breach only occurs if non-performance “so substantially
impairs the value of the contract to the injured party at the time
of the breach” as to allow the promisee to recover, in equity,
damages based on its remaining rights to performance.42  Corbin
defines total breach as “a non-performance of duty that is so ma-
terial and important as to justify the injured party in regarding
the whole transaction as at an end.”43  To determine if non-per-
formance is so material as to constitute total breach, the court
weighs the consequences in the specific case in light of the actual
custom among contracting parties.44
Total breach gives rise to damages for all past, present, and
future injuries.45  When a breach occurs that entitles the injured
party to damages for total breach, that party is entitled to restitu-
tion for any benefit it conferred upon the other party.46  Repudi-
ation allows for a restitution claim, even if it would not otherwise
give rise to a claim of total breach.47  Repudiation may result in
the injured party refunding any money payments received.48
Corbin notes that repudiation leads to the injured party’s choice
of remedy, either an action for actual damages resulting from
37 Id.
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 257 (1981).
39 CORBIN, supra  note 28, § 1105.
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 256 cmt. b. (1981).
41 Id.  § 243 cmt. b.
42 Id.  § 243.
43 CORBIN, supra  note 28, § 946.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 (1981).
47 Id.  at cmt. a.
48 CORBIN, supra  note 28, § 1108.
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non-performance or restitution for the amount of benefit con-
ferred upon the repudiating party.49
An action for restitution arises from a material breach of such
magnitude that it “would discharge the injured party from any
further contractual duty on [its] own part.”50  Corbin notes that
restitution “put[s] the injured party in as good a position as that
occupied by [it] before the contract was made.”51  It serves to
prevent one party from being unjustly enriched as a result of the
breach.  This contrasts with the recovery of contract damages,
which results in putting the injured party where it would have
been had the contract been fully performed.52  Damages are
meant to compensate for the equivalent of the promised per-
formance whereas restitution is meant to repay monies rendered
to restore the party to its previous legal position.53
A repudiation may be nullified if the injured party becomes
aware that the statement constituting repudiation has been re-
tracted.54  A retraction must occur before the injured party
changes its position in reliance on the repudiation, or before the
injured party communicates that it believes the repudiation to be
final.55  If repudiation is nullified, the injured party may still
bring an action for contract damages, although restitution may
no longer be an available remedy.56  Further, partial perform-
ance by the injured party affects the ability to recover restitution.
If the injured party continues to perform duties on the contract
after obtaining knowledge that the contract may be voidable on
certain facts, that action affirms the contract and prevents recov-
ery of a restitution award.57
C. Holding and Rationale
In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the
government repudiated its contracts with Mobil and Marathon,
and ordered the government to return the $158 million it had
received under those contracts.58  The Court stated that if the
49 Id.  § 1104.
50 Id.
51 Id.  § 1107.
52 Id.
53 Id . § 990.
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 256 (1981).
55 Id.
56 Id.  at cmt. a.
57 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 68 (1937).
58 Mobil , 530 U.S. at 607.
\\Server03\productn\O\ORE\80-4\ORE406.txt unknown Seq: 8  3-JUL-02 10:45
1476 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80, 2001]
government indicated it would break a promise under the con-
tracts, through either words or actions, creating a substantial im-
pairment of the contracts’ value, then the government would be
required to return all monies received, regardless of whether or
not the contracts would have ultimately proved profitable to the
companies.59  The Court found that the passage of the interven-
ing statute, OBPA, constituted a communication of intent to vio-
late the contracts, and thus repudiated those contracts.60
Further, the Court stated that incorporating the new statutes’
procedures and requirements would substantially deprive the
companies of the benefit of the contracts.61  The Court also
found that upon repudiation, restitution was the most appropri-
ate remedy, thus entitling the companies to a refund of all mon-
ies paid on the contract.62
The majority addressed in turn each of the government’s
claims.  In response to the claim that there was no breach of the
lease contracts,63 the Court pointed to the agreement’s language
stating that the contract was subject to OCSLA and all existing
regulations concerning the statute, as well as “‘all regulations is-
sued . . . in the future which provide for the prevention of waste
and the conservation’ of Outer Continental Shelf resources, and
‘all other applicable statutes and regulations.’”64  The govern-
ment claimed this provision gave it the authority to suspend the
leases pursuant to a statutorily mandated delay.65  The Court,
however, rejected this argument.  In construing the contract’s
language, the Court determined that because the contract specifi-
cally referenced existing regulations that were issued pursuant to
OCSLA, then that same limitation must apply to any reference
to future regulations.66  Thus, the contract would not be subject
to any future-enacted statutes or regulations unless they were
passed directly pursuant to OCSLA, rendering it immune from
OBPA.
As part of its argument, the government pointed to a regula-
tion existing at the time of the contract, 30 CFR § 250.12(a)(iv),
59 Id.  at 608.
60 Id.  at 618.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.  at 615.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.  at 616.
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which permitted the government to suspend leases for environ-
mental analysis and which was passed pursuant to OCSLA.67
However, the Court also dismissed this claim on policy grounds,
seemingly in direct contradiction to the terms of the contract,
stating that interpreting the regulation in this way would result in
too far-reaching of an effect.68  Through somewhat tenuous rea-
soning, the Court declared that incorporating authorized envi-
ronmental analyses suspensions into future-enacted statutes
would be too uncertain to enforce.69  The Court stated that the
contract language quoted above specifically excluded incorpora-
tion of any environmental analysis that would be required by fu-
ture statutes, thus rendering the contracts impervious to OBPA.70
As a third argument within its no-contract-breach defense, the
government looked to the language of OCSLA itself, which al-
lows for the suspension of a lease “if there is a threat of serious,
irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to life . . ., to prop-
erty, to any mineral deposits . . ., or to the marine, coastal, or
human environment.”71  The government claimed that this pre-
existing statutory term authorized a suspension of the lease con-
tracts.72  Rejecting this claim, the Court noted that the
government’s own letter to the companies asserted that the sub-
mitted exploration plan complied with all legal requirements.73
In concluding its discussion of the government’s first claim, the
Court addressed whether the requisite statements occurred to
constitute a repudiation.  It stated that enacted legislation is un-
equivocally a statement from the promisor to the promisee.74
Even though legislation is addressed to the public at large, and
repudiation requires a statement directed to the promisee, the
Court notes that the promisee is a member of the public at large,
and therefore included in the intended audience of the legisla-
ture’s “statement.”75  Thus, when the federal government is a
party to a contract, repudiation of that contract may rest on the
enactment of new legislation.
67 Id.
68 Id.  at 616-17.
69 Id.  at 617.
70 Id.
71 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1994).
72 Mobil , 530 U.S. at 616.
73 Id.
74 Id.  at 619.
75 Id.
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After finding that the government breached its contracts, the
Court then addressed the government’s second claim, that the
breach was not material enough to constitute a repudiation.  The
government contended that the contract term requiring a thirty-
day approval period for the exploration plan was not so essential
a part of the agreement that lack of compliance amounted to ma-
terial breach.76  The Court responded, however, that the compa-
nies, as contracting parties, expected no significant deviation
from the agreed upon terms.77  Accordingly, the enjoyment of
the rights flowing from the contract hinged upon compliance with
the time limitation.78  Violating such a limitation constituted
breach of one of the contracts’ material conditions, depriving the
companies of their agreements’ benefits.79  Thus, the Court
found that through legislation delaying the contracts’ perform-
ance, the government issued a direct statement of intent to mate-
rially breach the contracts, resulting in a repudiation.80
The government’s final two claims concerned the requested
remedy.  First, the government claimed that the companies
waived their rights to restitution by continuing to perform under
the contracts after the government repudiated.81  In supporting
its claim, the government pointed to three of the companies’ acts:
the companies submitted their final exploration plan two days
after OBPA became law, the companies asked the government to
overturn North Carolina’s objection, and the companies received
a suspension of the leases.82  The Court dismisses the latter two
actions as insufficient to amount to performance.83  In addressing
the fact that the plans were submitted after the new law was en-
acted, the Court attempted to clarify what performance is re-
quired to constitute a waiver.  According to the Court, not only
must the companies (the promisee) perform but the government
(promisor) must perform as well.84  Thus, following this reason-
ing, partial performance must be bilateral to constitute a waiver.
Finally, the government claimed that its repudiation of the




80 Id.  at 621.
81 Id.  at 621-22.
82 Id.  at 622.
83 Id.  at 623.
84 Id.
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contracts caused no actual damage.85  The Court stated that ac-
tual damage is immaterial in the case of repudiation in that repu-
diation gives rise to the right to repayment of all monies
transferred and does not measure actual damages on the con-
tract.86  Thus, the Court ordered a restitution award consisting of
the entire $158 million paid to the government.87
Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in the case, found that the
government did breach its contractual obligation, but did not re-
pudiate the contract.88  He emphasized that the Court should
consider the entire relationship of the contracting parties.89  Ste-
vens noted that the delay of approval did constitute breach, but
that the risks of entering into the contract were abundantly ap-
parent before the contract was formed.90  He argued that the de-
lay did not result in a total breach destroying the essence of the
contract.91  Stevens found little evidence of repudiation, noting
that the leases were suspended and not cancelled, thus illustrat-
ing an expression of the government’s intent to continue future
performance of its obligation.92  He was also persuaded by the
companies’ actions, in particular the submission of the plans after
the offending legislation was enacted, to illustrate an absence of
a full repudiation at the time of statutory enactment, the time the
alleged statement would have occurred.93  Thus, in the absence of
a repudiation, Stevens maintained that the companies were enti-
tled only to the contract damages caused by the delay in the ex-
ploration’s implementation.94
Given that both sides’ actions surrounding the alleged repudia-
tion could indicate merely a breach of a contract term, Justice
Stevens found the restitution remedy too generous.95  Justice Ste-
vens emphasized the equitable nature of restitution, stating that
the Court should award restitution only if it is just to do so in
light of the totality of the circumstances.96  Here, given the com-
85 Id.  at 623-24.
86 Id.  at 624.
87 Id.
88 Id.  at 624-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 Id.  at 625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 Id.  at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id.  at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93 Id.  at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94 Id.  at 625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95 Id.  at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96 Id.  at 630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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panies’ actions, the knowledge of the risk incurred, and the ac-
tual effect of extending the approval period beyond thirty days,
Justice Stevens asserted that the most appropriate remedy was
actual damages on the contract arising from the delay.97
II
IMPLICATIONS
Little commentary has yet appeared on Mobil , though it has
been cited as an example of the Court’s increasingly pro-business
tenor98 and its inability to adjudicate matters of environmental
law correctly.99  Likewise, few decisions have cited to it, although
those that have rely upon the case as a fundamental axiom.  The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a summary
judgment ruling in the government’s favor, finding that two mili-
tary veterans were entitled to bring a breach of contract claim for
free lifetime medical care.100  The court cited Mobil  as authority
for its holding that the passage of a statute requiring the veterans
to use Medicare was a breach of an implied-in-fact contract.101
The Court of Federal Claims cited Mobil  in Glass v. United
States102 for the theory that a party contracting with the govern-
ment is entitled to restitution regardless of whether the govern-
ment contract would have resulted in financial gain.  In Glass ,
the court found that the government’s passage of legislation that
affected a mortgage corporation’s ability to meet its regulatory
capital requirements constituted a breach of a contractual prom-
ise.103  More recently, the Court of Federal Claims, in finding in
favor of the Alaska Pulp Corporation, again turned to Mobil  for
the proposition that the government may repudiate a contract via
statute and that the contract’s viability does not affect the gov-
ernment’s liability for breach.104
The Court’s rationale in Mobil  subtly alters certain areas of
97 Id.  at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98 Barbara K. Bucholtz, Private Sector Issues in a Public Sector Retro-lution: The
Court’s Business-Related Decisions in the October 1999 Term , 36 TULSA L.J. 153
(2000).
99 Robin Kundis Craig, Mobil Oil Exploration, Environmental Protection, and
Contract Repudiation:  It’s Time to Recognize the Public Trust in the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf , 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11104 (2000).
100 Schism v. United States, 239 F.3d 1280, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
101 Id.  at 1290.
102 47 Fed. Cl. 316, 325 (2000).
103 Id.
104 Alaska Pulp Corp., Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 655, 659 (2001).
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established contract law, redefining, in part, the principles of res-
titution and of partial performance constituting a waiver.  The
Court narrows the applicability of partial performance by impos-
ing an additional requirement of bilateral performance.  Further,
the Court alters the function of the restitution remedy, with a
more pronounced change in the balance of wealth distribution
arising from its use.  Additionally, the Court’s rationale trans-
forms the nature of the United States as a contracting party.  By
expanding what constitutes an action on the contract, the Court
reconceptualizes the relationship between the government and
the governed, impacting the very nature of law itself.
In Mobil , the Court alters the requirements for performance
sufficient to reaffirm a contract and thus preclude the recovery of
restitution.  The Restatement of Restitution provides that “if a
person  continues to perform a contract after knowing facts which
make it voidable, it would be inferred that he affirms the contract
and hence . . . would not be entitled subsequently . . . to obtain
restitution.”105  Likewise, bringing an action that is valid only if
the transaction is binding also affirms a contract and prevents
recovery of restitution.  Thus, only unilateral action is required to
reaffirm a contract; the action of one party is sufficient.  How-
ever, the Court, in one sentence, seemingly redefines the nature
of the action required by stating, “[t]he performance question,
however, is not just about what the oil companies did or re-
quested, but also about what they actually received from the
Government.”106  Following this analysis, to successfully reaffirm
a contract, action must be bilateral.  Performance by one party is
not enough to affirm a contract.  Rather, an exchange of per-
formance must ensue before a contract is affirmed and a restitu-
tion remedy precluded.  The Court offers no apparent support or
discussion for this change in doctrine, stating simply that it must
be so.
By requiring bilateral performance to affirm a contract, the
Court narrows the doctrine’s potential applicability, hampering
those seeking to repudiate a contract effectively.  If a non-repudi-
ating party continues to perform, rather than doing so at its own
risk, it remains fully entitled to restitution so long as it does not
inspire the repudiating party to, in fact, revoke its repudiation
and resume actions on the contract.  Therefore, unilateral per-
105 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 68 cmt. b. (1937) (emphasis added).
106 Mobil , 530 U.S. at 622.
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formance is never sufficient to affirm a contract; only an effective
resumption of the entirety of the original contract’s obligations
may prevent the invocation of the restitution remedy.  Thus, by
limiting a party’s ability to allege waiver as a defense to restitu-
tion, parties are entitled to resume their pre-contractual legal po-
sition, even if they have significantly performed on the contract
with the full knowledge that the other party may refuse to per-
form.  Changing the doctrine in this way would seemingly en-
courage bad faith actors who may wish to obtain some of the
contract’s benefits, with the full knowledge that performance will
not be reciprocal and that any subsequent obligations they may
incur will be effectively erased through the remedy of restitution.
The Court expands restitution’s reach in other areas of its
opinion as well.  In so doing, the Court enhances the risks en-
tailed in an arms-length, fully informed business transaction, and
increases its own capability of directing the contracting parties’
relative wealth.  The Restatements note that the courts have the
ability to award restitution upon repudiation, even in response to
losing contracts.107  The restitution remedy is valuable in several
respects.  If a contract is rendered worthless, innocent parties can
recover their sunk costs on the contract and begin anew else-
where.  Such a remedy also allows for greater certainty between
contracting parties.  However, restitution is an equitable remedy,
greatly impacting the distribution of wealth between the parties.
Courts, therefore, should carefully examine what they are grant-
ing when they bestow an equitable restitution award.  The poten-
tial for windfall is high and the remedy’s invocation often
requires a highly subjective interpretation as to what constitutes
a contract’s destruction.
In Mobil , the Court, rather than limiting restitution’s function
to that of an equitable attempt at preventing unjust enrichment,
uses it to wipe a troubled, and somewhat convoluted, slate clean.
In this case, not only does restitution serve to compensate the
injured party to an allegedly repudiated contract, but it also re-
stores two fully informed businesses to the position they were in
before a very bad business deal went sour.  The companies were
fully aware of the fact that exploration in the Outer Banks area
was difficult, uncertain, and subject to numerous existing statu-
tory environmental delays.  Further, the contract itself was con-
tingent upon the affected state’s approval.  North Carolina had
107 See , e.g. , RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373 (1981).
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already objected to the plan, as they were allowed to do under
the contract, suggesting that long delays were imminent, regard-
less of the effect of any intervening legislation.  The awareness of
the risks involved before entering into the contract and the exis-
tence of other delays, deriving from the actual agreement’s
terms, suggest that if any damage award were justified, contract
damages for the actual contract’s breach would be sufficient for
damages caused by any additional delay required for environ-
mental analysis.
In justifying its restitution award, the Court analogizes the re-
payment of the corporations’ money to that of a refund given to
a purchaser of a lottery ticket not received, even if the ticket may
have been a losing one.108  This analogy, however, fails to ade-
quately encompass the true nature of the contract transaction in
the case.  The analogy suggests that entering into a large-scale
contractual agreement is akin to playing a game of chance with
astronomical odds.  Although every contract involves a certain
level of uncertainty and risk, the parties enter into it assuming
they would not be better off taking their money to the nearest
racetrack.  Further, and perhaps more importantly, the analogy
also fails to recognize the scope of the agreement.  The purchase
of a lottery ticket from a merchant and the subsequent refunding
of that money is a strikingly different transaction from a detailed
agreement for mineral exploration resulting in the transfer of
$158 million.  In finding that restitution is appropriate upon al-
leged nonperformance, even though performance may be finan-
cially disadvantageous to the non-repudiating party, the Court
gives a virtual windfall to the companies and, through its equity
power, rescues the businesses from financial losses stemming
from a potentially imprudent business deal.
In this sense, restitution operates less as an attempt at making
the party whole, but more as a punishment to the repudiating
party.  Here, the government, is, in effect, being penalized for
following its bureaucracy.  The Court is punishing the govern-
ment for enacting congressional legislation.  Thus, the judiciary,
through its equitable power, is in a position to penalize Congress
for acting pursuant to its constitutional mandate and enacting
legislation that seeks to address a constituent concern by protect-
ing national resources.  Imposing a restitution remedy in this case
ignores expanded notions of both business propriety and govern-
108 Mobil , 530 U.S. at 624.
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mental legislation that may recognize such values.  Thus, the
Court’s expansion of restitution serves to protect traditional cor-
porate financial interests at the expense of valuing not only legis-
lative autonomy, but also environmental concerns.
In addition to expanding certain contract law doctrines, the
Court’s decision transforms the nature of the government as a
contracting party.  Whereas the Court’s treatment of restitution
affects the distribution of wealth between parties, the Court’s
finding of a repudiation in this case greatly impacts the distribu-
tion of power not only between contracting entities, but on a
larger, societal scale as well.  The Court’s rationale impacts the
relationship between governmental actors and the government,
and, in addition, alters the nature of legislative action as it relates
to governance.
Crucial to finding that the government repudiated its contract
was the Court’s determination that congressional legislation may
be viewed as directed statements to particular entities sufficient
to alter the contracting parties’ rights and obligations.  Once
again, for a finding that is so pivotal to the outcome of the case,
the Court supplies very little discussion as to its rationale.  On its
face, a few possible arguments in favor of such a finding may
appear compelling.  Legislative enactments are pronouncements
made by a contracting entity.  Viewing them as such facilitates
communication between the contracting parties, a likely issue
given the potential unwieldiness of interacting with the United
States government in a contractual transaction.  Further, legisla-
tion may arguably embody the entity’s current position and view-
point regarding its own obligations, and the obligations of parties
with whom it may contract, concerning particular areas of law.
The Court, however, supplies none of these rationales as po-
tential support for its finding that legislation may be an individu-
alized statement.  It gives little justification, stating only that if
the members of Congress and the President are involved, then it
is “unequivocally” a statement by the obligor to the obligee.109
This assertion is less than compelling and begs troubling ques-
tions regarding the scope of the entity’s activity.  Regardless of
any rationale advanced, however, treating legislation as individu-
alized speech creates disconcerting implications regarding both
the nature of government in its role as a contracting entity and
109 Id.  at 619.
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the underlying nature of legislation and its impact on all those
within its purview.
The Court’s blanket assertion that presidential and congres-
sional involvement in legislation transforms the enactment into a
directed statement works counter to the argument the Court is
trying to establish.  Reference to the numerous individuals whose
participation comprises a governmental act illustrates the enor-
mity of scale and difficulty in precisely defining the government’s
identity as obligor.  The fractured nature of the parts composing
the whole of the entity suggest a highly probable lack of cogni-
zance by the governmental actor, casting doubt on the wisdom of
giving the enactment legal effect as a statement.  Legislation op-
erating as a statement repudiating a particular contract would
seemingly require the government-actor’s cognizance of the exis-
tence and relative position of the promisee, its own identity as
promisor to an existing contract, and an awareness that it has
made a statement directly relating and pertaining to the existing
contract.  This reality belies the suggestion that a legislative en-
actment could therefore qualify as any kind of cognizant, di-
rected statement aimed at one entity who is a party to a
governmental contract.110
In addition to creating troubling implications for what may
constitute action on the contract, viewing legislation as a directed
statement redefines the function of federal legislation and the
role of those governed by it.  Conceptualizing legislation as di-
rected speech creates a distinction between law as a tool of gov-
ernance versus law as a tool of communication.  When law’s
communicatory value outweighs its value as a mode of govern-
ance, questions arise as to the nature of law itself and its impact
on individual entities within its jurisdiction.
Arguably, federal legislation does have some communicative
value in enlightening and imparting national mores and values.
However, such a function differs from the use of federal legisla-
tion as directed communication.  When law becomes individual-
ized speech, the nature of law changes from that of a function of
order and justice to a means of facilitating particular transac-
tions.  All those within the government’s jurisdiction, then, be-
110 Following this analysis to its logical conclusion calls into question whether con-
tract law governing private individuals should ever apply to the United States gov-
ernment when it is acting as a party to a contract.  However, a discussion of this
matter is outside the scope of this Note.
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come subject to mere statements primarily meant to impact one
individualized party.  The true intended audience of governmen-
tal statements becomes unclear, weakening their authority as
law.  If law becomes a conversation, rather than a mandate, in-
creased avenues develop for the governed entities under the law,
creating new potential causes of action against the government,
and increasing the power of stronger societal groups at the ex-
pense of those without the ability to provoke or procure directed
legislative pronouncements.
CONCLUSION
In Mobil , the Court increases its own power to control the rel-
ative wealth of contracting parties by expanding the opportunity
for the recovery of restitution and limiting the parties’ ability to
invoke waiver as a defense to that claim.  Further, by assuming a
greater role in the determination of entitlements, the Court em-
powers stronger contracting parties by increasing the types of ac-
tions that may affect contractual rights and duties.  In shifting the
balance of power to stronger, cash-rich entities, the Court rede-
fines the relationship between the government and the parties
contracting with it.  In so doing, the Court transforms the nature
of the relationship between the government and all entities be-
neath it.  By strengthening the communicative nature of legisla-
tion, the Court distills constitutionally granted enactments into
fragmentary, isolated commentary on individualized contractual
obligations, thus turning governance into a financially motivated
bargaining tool.
